INTRODUCTION
I noticed the flashing light. It was not really a big flash. But still it drew my attention. In a few seconds, the heat wave arrived. After I noticed the flash, white clouds spread over the blue sky. It was amazing. It was as if blue morning-glories had suddenly bloomed up in the sky... [w] hen I looked down on the town from the top of that hill, I could see that the city was completely lost. The city turned into a yellow sand. It turned yellow, the color of the yellow desert.'
Over the past several decades, Iran has vigorously pursued nuclear technology under the pretense of its need for nuclear energy. However, increasing amounts of evidence have surfaced that suggests that Iran's nuclear program has not been entirely based on peaceful purposes. 3 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the enforcement agency behind the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), has attempted to enforce the NPT provisions of nonproliferation through the use of various sanctions. 4 So far, Iran has refused to comply with NPT provisions. 5 Iran's refusal to comply with the provisions of the NPT, despite IAEA sanctions, has become a reoccurring theme among nuclear threat nations. 6 Various approaches have been proposed to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat, which range anywhere from disbelieving the evidence, 7 becoming more understanding of Iran, 8 to heightened sanctions. 9 Despite a general disagreement among the international community and critics on an effective approach to the Iranian nuclear threat, Iran's noncompliance and pursuit of nuclear weapons remains unchecked. Although the various asserted approaches each contain positives and negatives, an effective solution will require more than one or two sets of sanctions before Iran will comply with international nonproliferation policy.'° However, Iran must comply at some point; the dangers of a nuclear Iran pose too great a threat."
This Note will focus on the reasons why sanctions have not worked against various nuclear threats, and how those issues may be resolved. The evaluation will include a study of the broad concerns facing both Iran and other nuclear threat nations and how the NPT has affected those concerns. Part II will give a brief overview of the NPT, how and why it was formed, and its goals and various provisions. Part III will examine the Iranian nuclear program, including the evidence that points to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and why Iran has determined that nuclear weapons are a necessity. Part IV will give a brief overview of sanctions that have been enforced on Iran and other nuclear threat nations. Part V will examine past sanctions and their effectiveness. Part VI will examine a few proposals that have been put forward as possible resolutions to the Iranian nuclear threat. Finally, Part VII will examine various solutions to make future sanctions upon Iran more effective. In consideration of the various problems and issues that have been presented through past sanctions, the final section will conclude with a recommendation of what steps should be taken to force Iran to comply with international nonproliferation policy.
I. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
The NPT, a United Nations treaty, 12 came into existence in 1970 s after undergoing "several years of negotiations.' 14 Prior to 1965, the unwillingness of the United States to agree to nuclear restrictions during the heart of the Cold War left the world with four nuclear powers and no effective international safeguards.
1 5 However, the addition of China into the nuclear family changed the international nuclear equation. China's acquiescence of nuclear weapons caused the United States and the Soviet Union to submit proposals to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation. 6 The adopted proposal called for the IAEA safeguards on nuclear weapons to only apply to Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). 17 Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) included the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China.' 8 To calm the fears of the NNWS, the "United States and United Kingdom volunteered to have IAEA safeguards apply to all their nuclear facilities except those with direct national security significance."' 9 In addition, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union agreed to "provide assistance to any NNWS party to the NPT that was subject to a nuclear attack or threat of a nuclear attack., 20 The NPT opened for signature in 1968, and went into effect in 1970 after obtaining the signatures of ninety-seven countries, and ratification by fortyseven countries; however, two nuclear states-China and France-did not sign the the IAEA is "to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or facilities.. . and to perform any operation or service useful in research on.. . atomic energy for peaceful purposes ..... 3 0 The bifurcated purpose of the IAEA and the NPT serves to provide NNWSs with nuclear material for the pursuit of peaceful nuclear technology. 31 Prior to facilitating the transfer of nuclear materials, the IAEA primarily requires that participating NNWS agree not to use nuclear materials for the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 32 Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and later ratified it in 1970. Iran has not been able to retain the level of commitment to the NPT that it had during the 1970's.
34 This is largely due to Iran's shift away from Western ideas in 1979.
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Iran no longer sought nuclear assistance from the United States; instead, fran sought assistance from communist Russia and China. 36 Iran's lack of commitment to the NPT was evidenced by Iran's reaction when, under IAEA scrutiny for NPT violations, Iran threatened to withdraw from the NPT in 2005. 37 Larijani, chief nuclear negotiator for the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, stated in 2005, "If [the IAEA] want[s] to use the language of threat, or send Iran's case to the Security Council, Iran will think twice about implementing the Additional Protocol [snap inspections] and will resume uranium enrichment., 38 The rocky relationship was further evidenced by the issuance of sanctions upon Iran by the IAEA in March 2007 when Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran's Foreign Minister, proclaimed that fran would limit its cooperation with the IAEA. 39 
II. IRAN's NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Since the 1950's, Iran has frantically sought nuclear capabilities along with other Middle Eastern nations. 40 However, fran has pursued its nuclear program to the extent that Iran's "ambitions create a feeling that a nuclear race is underway." 4 Iran obtained possession of its first nuclear reactor after receiving a small five-megawatt thermal reactor in the 1960's that the United States gave to it. 42 Iran took another major step in its nuclear pursuit in 1974 by forming the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). 4 3 Along with the formation of this organization, the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, 44 announced plans to build twenty-two reactors over a twenty-year span to meet Iran's energy needs. 45 Once again, Iran left the world with the impression that, as a State with no shortage in oil, 46 it was in a nuclear technology race.
Prior to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, 47 Iran entered into an agreement with the United States to exchange nuclear technology and practice nuclear safety. 4 8 In addition to this new agreement, Iran contracted with West Germany to build two nuclear reactors at Bushehr. 49 The Shah believed that the nuclear reactors at Bushehr would create the infrastructure that was necessary 41 . 45. Jafarzadeh, supra note 33, at 130. 46. United States officials have been unconvinced by Iran's claim that nuclear technology was necessary to meet energy requirements, because "Iran has no need for nuclear energy because the country is superbly endowed with natural resources of oil and gas that are significantly cheaper to develop. Howard, supra note 2, at 97. According to Whitehouse Spokesman Ani Fleischer:
Such facilities are simply not justified by the needs that Iran has for their civilian nuclear programme. Our assessment when we look at Iran is that there is no economic gain for a country rich in oil and gas like Iran to build costly indigenous nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Iran flares ("bums") off more gas every year than the equivalent power that it hopes to produce with these reactors. [Vol. 19:2 to industrialize Iran. 50 Two additional "930-megawatt reactors" were also scheduled to be constructed at Ahwaz. 5 ' Additionally, Iran was able to procure classified laser technology from the United States that could produce plutonium and "separate weapons-grade uranium from natural uranium.
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Iran's nuclear progression took a giant step backwards when Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, leader of the Islamic regime that overthrew the Shah in 1979, ended the construction of all nuclear reactors. 5 3 However, the temptation of nuclear capability was too great, and Iran eventually reinstated its nuclear program. 54 Prior to officially reinstating the program, Iran was able to first obtain assistance from China to build a new nuclear research facility at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (INTC) in 1984. s5 Iran also began to mine for uranium from its uranium reserves at Saghand, 56 where there is an estimated 5,000 tons of "high-grade uranium ore. ' T Iran was able to make significant advances in its pursuit of nuclear technology throughout the nineties. In 1995, Russia and Iran agreed to an $800 million contract for Russia to complete a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power reactor at Bushehr. 55 After nearly three decades of construction on the plant at Bushehr, Mottaki announced in February 2006 that "construction on the [Bushehr] plant was completed and that it would 'be soon ready to receive nuclear fuel, which Russia has pledged to supply."' ' 59 According to a later announcement by Mottaki, as of September 2007, the plant at Bushehr was ninety-five percent ready for operation. 6°A lthough Iran has claimed that its nuclear program is peaceful, there has been plenty of evidence to the contrary. 61 The true nature of the Iranian nuclear it is only pursuing nuclear technology for energy, the reality is that there are two nuclear programs in Iran. One, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), presents a legitimate nuclear face to the IAEA and the rest of the world... [t]he second nuclear program in Iran is secret in every aspect, from its invisible budget to its military-command hierarchy and its operative direction from the highest levels of power in the regime).
program must be evaluated by its public accomplishments and ambitions, as well as its rather extravagant and unexplainable secret accomplishments. 6 2 Because the NPT allows States to peacefully acquire and develop nuclear technology so long as it is not used for military purposes, there is no reason for Iran to keep part of its program secret from the IAEA. 63 Yet, Iran has kept large portions of its nuclear program secret, e.g., Natanz, Arak, and dealings with Kahn. 64 The purpose for keeping the nuclear program a secret could not have been to hide Iran's energy capabilities from the international community, because development of peaceful nuclear technology is not a violation of the NPT. 65 Despite Iran's claim, experts have predicted that "Iran could potentially produce a nuclear bomb within the next few years. 66 
III. SANCTIONS IMPOSED UPON NUCLEAR THREAT NATIONS
Iran is just one of several nations that have presented themselves as nuclear threats in the international community. In order to understand how various sanctions might affect Iran, it is necessary to evaluate sanctions that have been imposed against various nations that have conducted nuclear tests, developed nuclear capacity, or pursued nuclear capability in defiance of the international community. "import or export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment and freezing the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. 69 The Security Council agreed that the sanctions would be lifted if Iran complied with the measures within sixty days. 70 Compliance required Iran to "suspend.. . all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development; and work on all heavy-water related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water., 71 The Resolution was far weaker than originally proposed due to Russia's unwillingness to accept more stringent sanctions. 72 sanctions, 9 7 the United States, once again, offered positive incentives for compliance. 9 "
A. Iran

Sanctions upon
C. India
India's nuclear program began well before the formulation of the NPT with the formation of the India Atomic Energy Commission in 1944. 99 After India lost a war with China in 1962, India asserted that "nuclear science and technology was common intellectual property" and that the "use of atomic energy was purely a state's sovereign prerogative."'0 India achieved that success by testing its first nuclear weapon in 1974. 
D. Pakistan
Pakistan began its nuclear program years before India tested its first nuclear weapon. "1 ' In 1987, Dr. A.Q. Khan announced that Pakistan had the ability to produce and had produced nuclear weapons." l 2 In light of this information, the international community urged the United States to sanction Pakistan for its production of nuclear weapons.
1 3 The United States placed restrictions on its aid to Pakistan in hopes that Pakistan would cease its nuclear activities. 14 However, the economic sanctions imposed on Pakistan were eventually lifted following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, and Pakistan's nuclear program remains in place today. 12 0
E. France
France has been a member of the international nuclear family since nearly the beginning of the nuclear age and was allowed to possess, manufacture, and test nuclear weapons; however, France still rendered itself a nuclear threat as recently as 1995.121 France determined in 1995 that it was necessary to "maintain the credibility and reliability of French nuclear weaponry,"' 22 because France needed to test its nuclear weapons prior to the enforcement of a nuclear test ban treaty. 1 23 International pressure was applied to France hoping to persuade it to forgo plans to conduct a series of nuclear tests in 1995.124 President Jacques Chirac pronounced that France would not alter its plans to test its nuclear weapons, and that France would "retaliate against any trade or diplomatic sanctions instigated by opponents of its nuclear tests.' 25 
IV. WHY PAST SANCTIONS HAVE NOT WORKED
A. Inconsistent Rights
The structure of the NPT has become one of the main reasons that sanctions have not prevented nuclear proliferation.' 39 This is largely because the NPT has created two categories of nations labeled as "haves" and "have nots." 40 The NWSs of the NPT are permitted to manufacture, develop, store, and test nuclear weapons, which has allowed them to become the "haves"' 14 of the NPT. 143 The NNWSs of the NPT are not permitted to receive or exercise control over any nuclear explosive device, either directly or indirectly, which has caused these nations to become the "have nots" 1 4 of the NPT145 The United States, France, Great Britain, Russia and China have a legal right to control and manufacture nuclear devices; yet India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran do not have that legal right. 14 6
The creation of an exclusive weapons club 14 7 has been one of the prevailing complaints expressed by nuclear threat-nations. 48 The primary purpose behind giving nuclear rights to certain countries and not to others was to preserve the "exclusivity of a [nuclear] weapons club,' ' 4 9 Iran raised this concern in a United Nations Report following its first set of NPT sanctions: Iran's representative told the Council that "confidence could only be built through respect for and non-discriminatory application of international law and international treaties."' 5 Pakistan and India have also cited the inconsistent rights granted in the NPT as a reason why neither country will comply with the NPT. 151 As a result, neither Pakistan nor India is a signatory of the NPT, and 52 Although Pakistan and India are not NPT members, and thus are not subject to the NPT, they have both been subjected to the NPT's nonproliferation standard by the international community."' The NPT's granting of inconsistent rights has created an international standard that has undermined the effectiveness of sanctions. The NPT has created an international standard that has been applied to nonmembers of the NPT as if the standard were international law for all nations.1 54 This may have created a sense of false security among the NWSs that a NNWS would forgo the opportunity to obtain nuclear weapons solely on the basis of an accepted international standard.1 55 International law "generally derives from the practice of states and is accepted by them as legally binding."' 56 The problem with relying on this generality is that not all nations have followed the international standard of nuclear nonproliferation; thus, the NPT has not been accepted as international law for all nations.1 57 NNWSs will not comply with sanctions and accept an international standard unless they have an incentive to adhere to the international standard. There are currently no incentives that would entice NNWSs into accepting an international standard.1 58 However, it is easy to see why NWSs have adhered to the NPT international standard.
5 9 The ability to manufacture and use nuclear weapons can bring NWSs a sense of "[h]onor, prestige, and status... valued not because they induce some empty flattery but because they translate as influence when and where it counts."' 160 On the other hand, NNWSs must rely on a lack of prestige and security as an enticement for adherence, which will continue to undermine the effectiveness of sanctions.
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The NPT's use of the words "inalienable right" when referring to the NWSs' and NNWSs' ability to use nuclear technology has also undermined the 169 North Korea also used the language of the NPT to justify its development of nuclear technology. 1 70 In 2002, North Korea claimed that it had a right to produce nuclear weapons.' 71 North Korea used its right of self defense against a United States nuclear attack as justification for asserting a right to develop nuclear weapons. 172 Additionally, both Pakistan and India have refused tojoin the NPT unless they are given the same rights as the NWSs. 173 In 1998, United States Secretary of State Madeline Albright, following the imposition of sanctions on Pakistan, stated that "the world community is united not just in outrage and dismay but in action.",1 74 Secretary Albright's comments were ironic in that the inconsistency in NPT policy allowed both the United States and France to engage in nuclear testing while Pakistan and India were not allowed to test their nuclear weapons.
BLACK'S LAW
17 5 Until the NPT eliminates its inconsistency in granting rights, sanctions will continue to be ineffective.
B. Lack of Security
The perceived lack of security that the NPT provides NNWSs has created a large counterweight that sanctions must overcome before a nuclear threat nation will comply with nonproliferation. Although the NWSs pledged to provide a blanket of nuclear protection over each NNWS,1 76 it is very doubtful that countries such as Iran and North Korea trust the NWSs to provide them with adequate protection. 177 This may be because the NPT originated to deter proliferation of nuclear weapons in states like West Germany and Japan, not Arab states and other areas of the world that were remote from the cold war.
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The NPT was successful in safeguarding the world from nuclear proliferation in West Germany and Japan because" [it] accepted the U.S. and Soviet nuclear umbrellas."' 179 Each of the five nuclear threat states discussed in this Note has expressed a concern over the lack of security under the NPT. North Korea also expressed a concern about security when it defied the NPT. Since the Korean War, the United States and North Korea have been viewed as "enemies.' ' 97 North Korea has consistently claimed that it needs nuclear weapons to protect itself against a "nuclear threat from the United States."
198 North Korea's fear of nuclear attack initially stemmed from the United States' deployment of nuclear weapons to South Korea in 1958. 199 Additionally, India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was a response to security concerns following the actions and inactions of the United States. 2°0 After China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, the United States did not provide India with any security assurances. 20 1 Furthermore, the United States sided with Pakistan during India's war with Pakistan in 1971 22 India pursued nuclear weapons as an answer to the lack of security displayed by the United 192. JAFARZADEH, supra note 33, at 131. Iran initially agreed to forgo its pursuit of nuclear weapons when it joined the NPT under the shah's rule. Id. 193. HOWARD 
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States, 20 3 which initiated a chain reaction of security concerns between India and Pakistan, creating a nuclear arms race between the two countries. 2 0 4 The stated purpose for Pakistan's nuclear program was to "strengthen its forces to be used as a diplomatic bargaining chip and to reduce its dependence on military alliances., 20 5 After India's nuclear weapons test in 1974, Pakistan increased its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capability. 
C. The Inconsistent Goals of the NPT
The inconsistent goals of the NPT have made it nearly impossible for the NPT to effectively monitor and enforce nuclear nonproliferation. 20 7 The NPT's main purpose is to ban the use of nuclear technology for war-related purposes, but the treaty also provides for the facilitation of nuclear technology. 208 Thus, the NPT encourages the use and development of nuclear technology. 209 Article IV of the NPT provides that "[n]othing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties .. .to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes., 2 1 0 The NPT considers nuclear technology as an inalienable right, and it provides that all NPT parties "shall ... cooperate in contributing ... to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non- Kittrie , supra note 9, at 351 ("The overlap between civilian and military nuclear technologies poses perhaps the most significant challenge facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime. ... "); Spies, supra note 17, at 403 ("At the core of the crisis currently facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NPT upholds the right of all states to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes without discrimination.").
[Vol. 19:2 weapons, but also declares the development and use of peaceful technology to be an inalienable right.
2 1 3 The NPT also encourages all nations to share their peaceful nuclear technology with other nations. 214 The enforcement agency of the NPT suffers from the same inconsistent goals that have undermined the effectiveness of sanctions. The IAEA has "[t]hree main pillars -or areas of work -[that] underpin ... [its] mission: Safety and Security; Science and Technology; and Safeguards and Verification." 215 As referenced in the IAEA's three-part mission, the IAEA suffers from the same bifurcated purpose as the NPT. 2 16 The IAEA statute provides that the IAEA is "to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or facilities ... and to perform any operation or service useful in research on.. * atomic energy for peaceful purposes...., 2 1 7 Paralleling the NPT, the IAEA is also authorized to "establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information.., are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose...
,,2 This shows that the IAEA attempts to impede nuclear proliferation and facilitate nuclear technology. The bifurcated purposes of both the IAEA and the NPT have served to provide NNWSs with nuclear material for the pursuit of peaceful nuclear technology, yet these states have used nuclear material for nuclear weapons production. 2 1 9 By facilitating the transfer of weapons-grade fissile material, 22°t he IAEA fulfills its mission of "Science and Technology," but fails its mission of "Safety and Security.", 22 irp/threat/ocp8.htm ("Limits on access to fissile materials are the primary technical barrier to acquisition of nuclear weapons capability in the world today. But once these materials are acquired, construction of nuclear weapons should be assumed to be relatively straightforward.").
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able to procure most of the necessary nuclear technology and materials by disguising their purposes as being peaceful.
222
For example, Iran received assistance from China in 1984, which allowed Iran to expand its facility at Isfahan from what had primarily been a research facility to a "uranium conversion facility." 223 Iran conducted secret experiments at Isfahan in uranium conversion and fuel production in violation of the NPT. 224 Iran also violated the NPT when it secretly imported uranium to the Isfahan facility in 1982.225 Additionally, Iran entered into a contract with Russia for completion of one of its Bushehr plants, and engaged in a secret agreement to receive a "complete domestic fuel cycle" from Russia. 226 The IAEA was also unable to detect the assistance Iran received for nearly two decades from Pakistan. 27 From approximately 1985 until 2004, Iran received nuclear assistance from one of the world's biggest nuclear black market dealers, Abdul Qadeer Kahn. 228 In 2003, Iran admitted to the IAEA that it had received "blueprints for centrifuge design" from Khan. 229 [Vol. 19:2 knowledge because the LAEA has not been able to effectively distinguish between peaceful nuclear technology and war-related nuclear technology. Iran admitted to the existence of two secret nuclear plants at Natanz 23 ' and Arak that the IAEA was unable to detect. 2 32 The IAEA was only able to discover the secret facilities after their location was disclosed by an Iranian opposition group in August 2002.233 Natanz raised international concern because the plant "was a huge and 'extremely advanced' facility to house gas centrifuges that enrich uranium, 160 of which were already in operating order, ready to test and process the uranium hexafluoride gas that constitutes the raw materials of the enrichment process. 234 The plant at Arak was constructed to be a heavy water nuclear plant. 235 An LAEA report revealed that one of the Iranian facilities had trace elements of highly enriched uranium. 236 North Korea was also able to develop its nuclear weapons program without detection by the IAEA. 234. HOWARD, supra note 2, at 98 ("The site had the capacity for perhaps 50,000 more centrifuges, held in at least 1,000 specially designed machines, that could potentially feed a 1,000-MW reactor.").
235. Atomic Power Growth, supra note 41. In heavy water reactors, heavy water is used as both the moderator and coolant. Heavy water absorbs so few neutrons that it permits the use of natural uranium as fuel.... It is also a good producer of plutonium, and this type of reactor has been used in the United States without any turbo-generators attached to produce materials for weapon purposes. To produce Pu-239, rather than to minimize electricity generation costs, fuel re-loading takes place more frequently. 
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D. Lack of Uniformity
The lack of uniformity among NPT member nations has made it difficult to impose effective sanctions against nuclear threat nations. 240 It is extremely difficult to impose a set of sanctions under the NPT, which extends the time a nation will be able to remain in violation of the NPT. 24 ' The difficulty has 242 stemmed from the inability of NPT members to agree upon sanctions. NPT members have been unable to agree on sanctions because both Russia and China, members of the Security Council, generally only consider "the shortterm cost.. . of such sanctions, even though the sanctions costs may be a good long-term investment for the international community as a whole., 243 Russia has been a major roadblock in imposing tough sanctions against Iran. This is because Russia has been a primary producer of materials for han's nuclear program and continues to supply Iran with nuclear materials despite protests from NPT members. 244 As a result, the effectiveness of the NPT sanctions against Iran has been, and will likely continue to be, undermined by Russia's resistance to placing tough sanctions on Iran. 245 Because the NPT is unable to toughen sanctions against Iran, Iran has announced that it will continue uranium enrichment 246 in defiance of the NPT's second Resolution.
247
The disunity among NPT nations also led to weaker sanctions against North Korea. South Korea nor China would initially agree to place economic sanctions on North Korea. 249 Eventually, China and North Korea agreed to economic sanctions, which led to further negotiations with North Korea. 250 Additionally, Resolution 1718 was initially created to authorize the use of force if necessary to enforce the provisions of the Resolution upon North Korea. 25 ' However, at the insistence of China and Russia, the provision allowing for the use of force was dropped, 2 52 and enforcement under U.N. Charter Chapter VII, Article 41 replaced the use of force provision. 2 53 U.N. Charter Chapter VII, Article 41 restricts the Security Council to "measures not involving the use of armed force.... The exclusion of the use of force has essentially left Resolution 1718 without any real consequences other than economic penalties should North Korea fail to comply. 255 The disunity among nations continues to be an area of weakness that NNWSs will continue to exploit in the future.
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V. SOLUTIONS Sanctions will not be effective until the international community addresses the underlying concerns which nuclear threat nations have raised. 257 A few broad changes would greatly enhance the effectiveness of sanctions. 258 
A. Complete Nuclear Disarmament
One of the underlying tensions that has encouraged nations to resist nuclear compliance, despite sanctions, is that certain nations are granted the right to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons while others are refused that right. 259 Complete disarmament by all countries is necessary before sanctions can be effective in enforcing nuclear nonproliferation. 260 Article VI of the NPT requires member states to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." 26 1 Despite this provision in the NPT, no timeframe has been adopted for complete disarmament. 26 2 One concern that has been raised by both Iran and North Korea regarding sanctions is the discriminatory manner in which sanctions have been imposed. 2 63 Both of these nations have these concerns because of the inconsistent nuclear rights created by the NPT.
2 4 Certain states are given the inalienable right to manufacture nuclear weapons and develop peaceful nuclear technology, while other states are only given the inalienable right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. 265 If complete nuclear disarmament were achieved, these concerns would no longer be relevant. 2 66 The security and discriminatory concerns that Iran has raised as a condition precedent to complying with nuclear nonproliferation would no longer be valid if all nations agreed to complete nuclear disarmament. 267 Iran's nuclear program only reemerged after its loss in the Iran-Iraq war. 268 Iran also believed that nuclear weapons were necessary to defend itself against a nuclear capable Israel. 269 If disarmament were adopted, Iran would no longer need nuclear weapons to defend itself against Israel's nuclear weapons, because
270
Israel would no longer have nuclear weapons.
The elimination of nuclear weapons by all parties would also eliminate Iran's need to gain international prestige as one of the few elite nuclear [Vol. 19:2 its position as a regional power. 272 Iran specifically noted that the abilities of certain countries to maintain nuclear weapons legally under the NPT are discriminatory. 2 73 Complete disarmament would make Iran's claims of international discrimination unfounded. 27 4 One of the primary reasons that nuclear capable nations have not agreed to complete disarmament is that nuclear weapons have a deterrent effect on enemy nations.
2 75 The use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent has been successful because it allows a nation to dramatically reduce the amount of time it would take to respond effectively to an attack. 276 However, the risk of nuclear holocaust is so great that the use of nuclear weapons as deterrents no longer justifies the means. 277 The availability of advanced military technology has made the possession of nuclear weapons for a quick and effective response no longer necessary. 2 78 For example, the United States has become less reliant upon the availability of nuclear weapons by "replacing its traditional Cold War 'Triad' of missiles, submarines, and bombers with a 'New Triad' that incorporates important non-nuclear elements (including missile defenses). 279
280
Disarmament must also be met with a certain measure of caution. When nations undergo the process of complete nuclear disarmament, they should proceed through an agreement that would call for bilateral reductions. 2 8 A bilateral agreement based upon a sliding scale of reduction would avoid the potential problem of a single nation using its sole possession of all remaining nuclear weapons to its advantage. 282 Complete disarmament will also bring the advantage of a more valid 
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excuse for the use of force if Iran fails to comply with nuclear nonproliferation. 283 Under international law, a preemptive strike upon another nation must be preceded by an imminent threat. 284 Subject to interpretation, Iran's possession of nuclear weapons may be considered an imminent threat. 285 However, it would be difficult to claim that Iran's possession of nuclear weapons has created an imminent threat but the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and China has not created an imminent threat.
2 8 6 Complete disarmament would eliminate the need to create a distinction between Iran's possession of nuclear weapons and the NWSs' possession of nuclear weapons. 28 7 Currently, there are no plans for the five NWS and the other nuclear nations to enter into a treaty for complete disarmament. 288 At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, "[ilt was clear that nuclear weapons states were not going to agree on any disarmament commitments ... at least not until 201 0., 289 Although disarmament would likely take several years to complete, a step in that direction might eliminate Iran's claim of discrimination. 2 90
B. Coercive Sanctions and the Use of Force
Sanctions must only be imposed after an evaluation is made of what type of sanctions will most effectively coerce the receiving nation into compliance. Each nuclear threat must be evaluated according to its unique circumstances in order to create effective sanctions. 291 For example, North Korea is an economically impoverished country starving for resources. 292 As a result, the United States provided positive incentives as a form of sanctions, 293 296 Iran has the third largest oil reserves in the world; 29 7 thus, a sanction that provides Iran with additional energy to entice compliance would be unlikely to succeed. 298 Sanctions must be stringent enough to impose actual harm to the receiving country. 299 "Sanctions contribute to the achievement of coercive foreign policy goals when the total costs imposed or threatened by the sanctioned activity are higher than the costs the target expects to incur from complying with the sender's demands.,, 3 00 The coercive effect is lost if the cost of defiance is less than the cost of compliance. 30 '
It is also critical that sanctions only be imposed if the nation imposing them would be capable of enduring the sanctions itself. 30 2 The United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan and India in 1998 only after finding a way to exempt fertilizer from India's economic sanctions package 30 3 and wheat from Pakistan's economic sanctions package. 3 0 4 The United States was forced to consider that India was "the second-largest importer of American phosphate fertilizer" and that Pacific Northwest farmers would be unable to place a bid for a thirty-seven million dollar wheat order form Pakistan. 3 0 5 This left the economic sanctions without sufficient coercive effect and created the impression that the United States was unwilling to endure the effects of sanctions against India and Pakistan. 3°6 It is necessary to evaluate what form of sanctions will actually have a coercive effect that will produce a cost of defiance greater than compliance. 30 7 Nations that have received sanctions as a result of nuclear noncompliance have typically been non-Western nations.
3 0 8 Assuming that coercive sanctions are based on the Western-oriented goals of depriving a nation of "economic prosperity and physical pleasure," these coercive sanctions may not raise the cost of defiance to an appropriate level. 3 9 Instead, "[a]ltemate potential target state motivators, such as nationalism, religious conviction, and other ideologies that exalt martyrdom and suffering can raise the level of pain necessary to achieve coercion.
,,3 0
It is often difficult to determine what form of sanction will be effective in coercing the defying nation into compliance. Iran is a nation that will be difficult to sanction because of its vast oil supply. 311 Because oil is in such a high demand, imposing sanctions based on Iran's oil exports would be unrealistic at best, and would likely prove to be more detrimental than it is worth. 312 This, coupled with the goals behind Iran's nuclear program, which are: prestige, influence, and security, require that the cost of defiance be high. 313 Because of this, it has been argued that coercive sanctions are largely ineffective. 314 One critic noted that "[e]conomic sanctions have two things in common: They have never worked, and they almost always harm those they are trying to help. But they do satisfy the emotions of those who want to 'do something.'"3 5 For example, sanctions against Cuba have been in place since 1961, "without the slightest impact upon Fidel Castro's hold on power. ' , 316 When sanctions have been found to be ineffective, it is essential that the sending nations "up the ante., 3 17 The imposition of never ending sanctions only accomplishes two things: first, the sender learns that the sanctions aren't working and are likely to never succeed; 3 18 second, they allow the receiving country to remain in noncompliance. 3 1 9 Therefore, sanctions must include some form of deadline for compliance. An understanding of possible military attack must also be included with any set of coercive sanctions. 320 A series of sanctions that escalate the cost of defiance can be effective, 32 ' but there must still be some form of cutoff date for compliance. 322 It has generally been asserted that preemptive military action against Iran would be a violation of international law, and should only be used as "a last resort., 323 Although military action should be used only as a last resort, it must be accepted that at some point military action may become a necessity. Economic sanctions in Iran can only be effective to a certain degree, and at some point Iran must either comply or be forced to comply. 324 The devastation that an Iranian nuclear attack could cause is far too great a risk to rely solely on diplomatic measures. 325 Diplomatic measures will only work with those nations that are willing to be persuaded through diplomatic means. 326 When considering the consequences of a purely diplomatic approach, it is important to remember which states bear the most risk. For example, as John F. Coverdaled stated, "No Frenchman goes to bed nervous about Great Britain's nuclear weapons... [e]very sane Israeli, Turk, or Bahraini, on the other hand, is deeply concerned about the possibility of an Iraq or Iran with nuclear weapons and medium-range ballistic missiles., 327 The United Nations Security Council has not yet authorized the use of force against Iran. 328 Although the authorization has not yet been granted, past liberal interpretations of the United Nations Charter would likelyjustify the use of force against Iran should Iran fail to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons. For example, the United Nations Charter prohibits a nation from threatening to use unauthorized force against another country. 329 Article 2(4) provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
330
Many commentators have suggested that the Article 2(4) is "dead" due to an international norm that has not been followed or enforced for decades. 331 These commentators suggest that violations of Article 2(4) have created a "one-way ratchet, in which violations progressively undermine a norm with no room for recovery in between violations., 332 The inability or unwillingness to enforce Article 2(4) has been recognized by United States officials, many of whom have positions that "favor abandoning treaty obligations inconsistent with U.S. national interests.
3
Although Article 2(4) may not be considered as significant as Article 5 1--the article that allows the use of force under certain circumstances--the threat that a nuclear Iran could pose would lead the same U.S. officials to conclude that Article 51, like Article 2(4), is nothing more than "a paper constraint unsuited to the contemporary strategic environment and likely, if respected, only to hinder the U.S. exercise of power." 334 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides for two exceptions to its prohibition against the use of force. 335 The Article provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. . ,"336 One interpretation of Article 51 is that a Member State may only act in self-defense once an attack on that state has already occurred.
33 7 If Iran were allowed to attack the United States, Israel, or any other nation with a nuclear weapon, the attack would be far too great to justify this interpretation of Article 5 1.338 However, there is an alternate interpretation that would allow a nation to exercise self-defense prior to an attack. 339 This interpretation stems from preexisting international law of self-defense, and according to most experts, would require the "existence of an imminent threat.
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The requirement that a threat be "imminent" before anticipatory action may be taken would allow the defending nation a little latitude when determining whether an "imminent" threat exists. President George W. Bush has suggested that the interpretation of "imminent," following 9-1 1, "had to be adapted in order to face the new threats of [ United Nations may view a preemptive attack on a nuclear capable Iran as a "preventive action" and not a "preemptive action. 343 The difference between a "preventive action" and a "preemptive action" is that a "preventive action" is an act "against a more distant perceived threat." 344 However small the distinction between a more distant threat and a more imminent threat may seem, the misinterpretation of what is preventive and what is preemptive will have a large legal significance in the international realm. 345 Yet President Bush has already begun to lay the framework for a defense should the United States determine that a nuclear capable or near nuclear capable Iran is close enough to an imminent threat to justify preemptive action. 346 Additionally, any restrictions the United Nations may impose on the use of force will not hinder individual nations, or a coalition of nations, from using force outside the framework of the United Nations.
34 7 When a nation's well being is threatened, the decision-makers in that nation must act to protect the nation's well being. 348 "It is unlikely that any legal principle will be adhered to which runs counter to the instinctual urge to protect through preemption, no matter how the international community views anticipatory force." 349 International opinion and international law may perceive preemptive attacks as only justified under an imminent threat, 350 but "any such line-drawing may be illusory." Iraq's buildup of weapons of mass destruction was viewed as a serious potential security threat against the United States, which required "anticipatory action to defend [them]selves. '' 354 Although the 2003 Iraq war is not considered as a preemptive self-defense action by United States officials, it is an example of the lengths the United States will go to justify a preemptive war when its security is threatened. 355 Many experts have suggested that the United States' reliance on Resolution 1441 was a "strained reading of the relevant Security Council resolutions," and that the "real motive [of the war] was a neoconservative push to transform the politics of the Middle East through regime change in Iraq. 356 The 2003 Iraq war is a perfect example that "any such line-drawing" between preventive action and preemptive action "may be illusory.
C. Formation of a Nonproliferation Coalition
Before sanctions can be toughened, some form of consensus among the international community must exist. 358 The NPT has been unable to deter China and Russia from becoming major road blocks in creating effective sanctions against Iran. 359 The international demand for oil has strengthened Russia's oil market to the point where the demand has undercut the West's ability to leverage Russia into tougher sanctions on Iran. 360 Russia's assistance is important because "[t]he Russians probably know more about Iran's nuclear ambitions than anyone else -they're helping to build Iran's new nuclear power plant -and Russia must agree if the U.N. Security Council is to impose punishing sanctions., 36 1 The Security Council consists of the five NWSs, which not only retain nuclear weapons, but have the power to veto any action under the NPT. 362 The Security Council is not the "most appropriate body to be entrusted with the authority for oversight over non-proliferation or nuclear disarmament."
363
Fixing the NPT before Iran is able to produce nuclear weapons may be unrealistic. 364 There are too many problems with the NPT and LAEA for the NPT to be the primary enforcement mechanism. 365 The loophole granting NNWSs an inalienable right to obtain peaceful nuclear technology would have to be amended along with an agreement on complete nuclear disarmament before any form of uniformity among the international community could be created. 366 "Many developing and Non-Aligned states, which have been generally more supportive of Iran's position, are wary of accepting additional constraints on the development of nuclear technology, absent demonstrable progress on nuclear disarmament issues. 367 It is very unlikely that the NPT can be altered to create a level of uniformity before Iran is able to obtain nuclear capability. The NPT is only reviewed for changes every five years. 368 Any significant progress in the 2010 NPT Review Conference is unlikely to occur, given that it took the 2005 NPT Review Conference nearly two and a half weeks "just to agree on how it should refer to the 2000 Disarmament Obligations.', 369 The formation of a coalition outside the framework of the NPT that strives for complete nuclear disarmament is necessary to gain the required uniformity. Coalitions, such as the coalition formed during the Iraq war, have been instituted in the past to address similar international concerns. 370 The NPT may even support an approach that calls for a separate coalition, because the NPT recommends that a separate agreement be formed for complete nuclear disarmament. 371 There is also support among NNWSs and NWSs. 372 For example, China and France initially refused to join the NPT, because NNWSs would be unable to obtain proper security guarantees unless there was full nuclear disarmament by all parties. 373 As a consequence, "China and France did not sign the treaty until 1992." 374 Similarly, India and Pakistan refused to join the NPT for the same reasons. 375 Nonproliferation coalitions that are currently in existence would become more effective ifNWSs were to become members. 376 The Acronym Institute is a coalition of eight nations that call for complete nuclear disarmament. 37 7 Additionally, a coalition of seven nations sponsored a U.N. resolution on nuclear disarmament in 1998 and 1999.1 78 A coalition of NWSs and NNWSs with the same goals as the two referenced coalitions would bring the uniformity needed to impose heightened sanctions on Iran, because the primary goal of each nation would be to enforce complete nuclear disarmament and could provide the necessary military capabilities to enforce nuclear nonproliferation. 37 9
VI. PROPOSAL
Iran's current governmental regime has consistently viewed the West with disdain since coming to power. 380 "From its first months in power to its latest dealings with the IAEA, the Iranian regime has related to the West with lies, deception, denial, and outright contempt.", 381 Iran's past dealings with the IAEA illustrate that Iran is unwilling to undergo "honest, open relations with the international community., 382 Continuing on the current path, using the NPT and the IAEA through purely diplomatic means, will inevitably leave Iran with nuclear weapons capability.
383
It has been repeatedly suggested that gaining a more broad understanding of Iran and what types of alternate policy options are available will make Iran more open to diplomatic measures. 384 As part of this proposal, the United States should become more engaging, which would, in effect, lessen Iran's fears that the goal of the United States is to topple the Iranian regime. 385 It has been asserted that these measures would allow the United States to have "a more reasonable image of Iran [so] that we can imagine their receptivity to offers of negotiation without assuming that their responses and intentions will always be hostile. 386 As optimistic as this proposal sounds, Iran has a horrible track record with the IAEA, which leaves "no justification for trusting it in any negotiation process. 387 fundamental and requisite step, namely a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons... and we urge them to take that step now. [Vol. 19:2
Additionally, it has been proposed that the best means of forcing Iran to comply with the NPT is for the international community to reaffirm a commitment to peaceful means. 388 This requires the international community to re-invigorate the U.N. Charter Article 2(3) as a reminder that disputes are to be resolved through peaceful means. 389 This proposal further specifies the importance for the United States to form a greater commitment to "international law and. . . to the NPT.
' ' 39 0 As a result of these measures, the international community may re-invigorate the nonproliferation regime.
39 1 To re-emphasize, Iran's past dealings with the IAEA have led to "no justification for trusting it in any negotiation process.
392
Another proposal involves heightening existing sanctions against Iran and strengthening the NPT.
39 3 The failure to impose sufficiently strong sanctions upon nuclear threats in the past has led to recent failures in nonproliferation enforcement. 394 Strengthening sanctions can circumvent this problem, because it will increase the level of coerciveness and will put more pressure on Iran to comply. 395 Also, the proposal parallels the weakness in sanctions with the weakness in the NPT. 396 To correct this problem, it has been proposed that the NPT should be amended to enhance "the IAEA's verification and monitoring authorities... through a U.N. Security Council resolution. 39 7 However, the possibility of an amendment to the NPT is unrealistic because of the lack of uniformity among the Security Council members. 39 8 This proposal also recognizes the lack of uniformity in the international community when it comes to sanctions. 399 Although strengthening current sanctions and enhancing the NPT are important steps toward attaining Iranian compliance, further steps must also be taken. A coalition of nations that are committed to complete nuclear nonproliferation should be formed outside the framework of the NPT. There are too many problems for the NPT itself to successfully enforce nuclear nonproliferation. A separate coalition would have the necessary uniformity to enforce nuclear nonproliferation. Complete nuclear disarmament is a critical and necessary step towards the prevention of Iran and other nations from obtaining nuclear weapons. 400 Complete disarmament would resolve the concerns that Iran has cited as reasons for the development of its nuclear 388 
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program; mainly, prestige, influence and security. 401 If no nation has nuclear weapons, Iran can no longer base its decision for noncompliance upon the discriminatory application of international law. 402 .Furthermore, Iran may no longer feel it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself against other states with nuclear weapons. Along with complete nuclear disarmament, sanctions must be heightened and a cut-off date must be set. This note recommends a time period of three years for Iran to completely comply with the NPT. A three-year time period will allow Iran enough time to comply without creating a deadline that it could not possibly meet. This time period will also provide security to surrounding nations, because it is estimated that Iran will not able to produce nuclear weapons within three years. 4 0 4 Additionally, a series of goals or steps for complete compliance should be set and put in place in ninety day increments. A series of steps will ensure that Iran is on track to meet the three-year deadline. Along with a series of goals, a series of escalating sanctions should be developed and imposed on Iran every ninety days if Iran fails to comply with any ninety-day goal. For example, early sanctions could target the wealthy citizens of Iran by completely eliminating the import of luxury goods. In addition, a sanction that completely shuts off international travel of all Iranian governmental leaders could also be imposed. As the end of the three-year period draws closer, sanctions should be imposed that have an effect on the general Iranian population that could potentially lead to a regime change through Iranian resistance groups. At the end of three years, if ran has not has not complied, military enforcement should be deployed.
The international community cannot let Iran resist compliance despite the use of sanctions as Cuba has been able to do. 40 5 Iran would create too great a threat if it were able to obtain nuclear capability. 40 6 Continuing ineffective sanctions will not coerce Iran into compliance. A cut-off date must be set and enforced, either through the NPT or through a separate coalition formed with the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. 40 7 It is time for nuclear nations to take the necessary steps towards complete nuclear disarmament. 40 8 As Mikhail Gorbachev once said, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. ' A 0 9
